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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION : 
CO., a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
vs. : 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and : 
through the DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
No. 17693 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Third-Party Plaintiff-
Re spondent, 
vs. 
THE AETNA CASUALTY 6c SURETY 
CO. , 
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE, 
OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, 
AND OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT t 
Appellants do not reply to the preliminary statements 
in respondent's brief, other than to refer the Court to appel-
lants' original brief and to note that by requesting that Thorn 
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be overruled, respondent has framed the issue in the case: 
Whether to overrule Thorn by affirming the district court or to 
follow Thorn by reversing the district court. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are two fundamental defects in the Statement of 
Facts in UDOT's brief. First, it does not agree with the facts 
found by the trial court. Although Parson disputes the trial 
court's ultimate decision, the dispute is only over the lower 
court's conclusions of law, not the findings of fact. 
Second, UDOT's Statement of Facts does not comport 
with the record. It consists of facts taken out of context, 
factual allegations contrary to or unsupported by the record 
and legal arguments. In addition, it ignores several salient 
facts establishing its liability. 
What follows is a more specific response to the 
various allegations in respondent's Statement of Facts, taking 
them roughly in the order in which they are presented. 
UDOT's first assertion, contained in the introductory 
portion of its Statement of Facts, is that the provision in the 
Standard Specifications (Section 104.02) regarding supplemental 
agreements is not a changed conditions clause. This is clearly 
a legal argument. The issue is not what to call Section 
L04.02, but whether Parson was entitled to relief thereunder. 
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UDOT's statement on p. 3 of its brief (unsupported by any cita-
tion to the record) that no change of a type contemplated by 
Section 104.02 was recognized by UDOT is blatantly false. UDOT 
specifically and expressly admitted that Parson was entitled to 
a supplemental agreement (Ex. 26-P). 
UDOT's statement at the bottom of page 3 that Parson 
could have used sources other than pit 1 or 2 is false. UDOT 
admits at p. 17 of its brief that there were no other feasible 
alternatives. 
Contrary to UDOT's present allegations, UDOT has pre-
viously conceded that the procedures by which pits 1 and 2 were 
determined by UDOT to be acceptable were not the procedures 
required by UDOT's own rules (Tr. 960-963, 990-999). Also, 
prior consideration of these pits was made pursuant to specifi-
cations much less strict than those confronting Parson. 
Compare the specification table on Sheets 31 and 32 of the 
Special Provisions (Ex. 3-P) with the predecessor specifica-
tions on p. 136 of the 1970 edition of the Standard Specifica-
tions (Ex. 1-P). The previous contractors using these pits 
were also operating under the earlier, looser specifications. 
The last of these contractors had real problems meeting even 
the old materials specifications, and the UDOT project engineer 
recommended that these prospects not be used again (Tr. 
1014-1016; Ex. 86-P). At trial, a UDOT employee admitted that 
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the contractors preceding Parson had removed all of the 
material described on Sheet No. 2B from these sources. (Tr. 
861-862). 
The next portion of respondent's Statement of Facts 
purports to discuss Parson's pre-bid activities and bid. UDOT 
does not dispute that Parson had less than three weeks within 
which to investigate prior to its bid. Yet the State alleges 
that Parson should have conducted an investigation that could 
not possibly have been performed in this limited period of time. 
Notwithstanding UDOT's legal argument on p.4, UDOT did 
expressly warrant all of the positive representations in the 
contract documents# thereby accepting the risk of inaccurate 
representations (Standard Specification Section 102.05). It is 
these affirmative statements, as confirmed by on-site inspec-
tion, that lulled Parson into reliance. 
The representation in Special Provision Sheet No. 44 
that, "Both Prospect No. 1 and Prospect No. 2 have been pre-
viously used for untreated base course and bituminous surface 
course on previous 1-70 projects," is among the most mis-
leading. This reference was obviously intended to show the 
successful prior use of these pits, not that these pits had 
been found no longer usable. There was nothing to put Parson 
or any other reasonable contractor on notice of a problem about 
which previous contractors should be consulted. 
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UDOT attempts to make much of the fact that Parson had 
not worked in the area. However, the bidding was open to all 
contractors, not just the local ones. Unfortunately, the in-
formation presented by the State was extremely misleading to 
all except those with personal knowledge of the actual con-
ditions. 
The allegations that Wilson was told that blend sand 
might have to be added should be contrasted with the earlier 
statement in the contract documents that additives need not be 
used. More significantly, even the addition of blend sand 
could not turn the prospect No. 2 product into specification 
material. (Tr. 263-285). -
Although Wilson and McDonald may have known generally 
of the type of documents sometimes found in UDOT files, it is 
UDOT's Spensko that had the most specific knowledge of that 
information (Tr. 1020-1022). Yet Spensko made representations 
in the contract documents contrary to that information. Based 
on their prior experience, Wilson and McDonald had no reason to 
expect that UDOT files would contradict UDOT'S representations 
as to site conditions. It was UDOT'S employee, Spensko, who 
admitted his "oversight" in failing to communicate accurate 
information to bidders (Tr. 996-1000). 
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Even the contract's reference to documents on file 
(Standard Specification Section 102.05, as amended by the 
Special Provisions) is misleading. That section does not refer 
to contractor-generated documents or to general geological 
data, both of which UDOT claims Parson should have looked for. 
Moreover, none of the geological evidence submitted at trial 
challenged the testimony of plaintiff's trial experts as to the 
variable make-up of the formation and the abrupt, unforeseeable 
changes in materials encountered by Parson (Tr. 766-770). 
UDOT next contends that Parson did not rely on the 
information in Sheet No. 2B or Special Provision No. 44 in pre-
paring its bid. The record is to the contrary. Wilson, the 
one responsible for preparing the bid, testified to the con-
trary, stating he reviewed this information, ". . . in great 
detail and used it to compile the heart of my entire bid." 
(Tr. 158-161). UDOT claims that such reliance was "misplaced 
and incompetent." If information in the plans and specifica-
tions is known to be so unreliable, it should not be presented 
at all. In pointing out that the contractor with previous ex-
perience using these prospects made the high bid, UDOT merely 
highlights the severe handicaps for the other bidders created 
by the state's misinformation. 
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selects equipment and operating procedures based upon what it 
is told in the plans, specifications and other contract docu-
ments. UDOT did designate pits 1 and 2 as acceptable for use 
on the project. It also admitted at trial (Tr. 1012-1016) and 
in its brief that these were the only materials sources reason-
ably available. Its suggestion at page 10 of its brief that 
another source could have been used cannot be taken seriously. 
UDOT's description of the problem Parson encountered 
regarding aggregate size is one of the few parts of its brief 
that is quite accurate. Because of the softness of the 
material present even after waste was rejected/ attempts to 
crush the material that passed the number 16 screen into 
material retained by the number 50 screen resulted in a flour 
like product incapable of being retained by a number 200 
screen. Hence/ the excess "minus 200,s" (Ex. 37-P, 38-P). 
UDOT's allegations regarding the Parson stockpiles are 
nonsense. Specification stockpiles obviously require a source 
that produces specification materials. Although Mecham may 
have found these materials deficient/ as did Parson, he had no 
solution either. Under the contract, Mecham was required to 
determine the "exact location and manner of stockpile" (Special 
Provision Sheet No. 44). Wilson never testified that Parson 
intentionally built borderline stockpiles, either on this or 
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any other project. In ifisjuoiiu-n- I «> leading questions, Wi lson 
indicated the ob v ious fact Hint; contract o r s g e i 1 e r a 1 1 > :i < > n o t 
attempt to g*. I U M I H I I ban the specifications require, if tc > do 
so v, >bjd cost them money i|Ti . J I1^ «h:. '. »l>- .1st, indicated that 
c other job Parson was confronted with stockpiles (.urn 
were out of ^poi i I i cii i» m • not that Parson intentionally 
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Spennlo/i-, testimony cited tvy UDOT that 50% waste is 
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 F)ioiecf .', puzzling. This wasn't 
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that the State was w u liny to pay, Ji • .* "MiT) , i hindsight 
that the State has fabricated the "Jack of Know-how" theory. 
The Stat H t •* wi I f n«ifr IIMI » , percent of ih" Parson 
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r >s taken dnrinq trial, more than one ami n ha] f 
years after Parson abandonee tlvj i»«"k(oles, and tl le portions 
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of the piles tested were not specified (Tr. 1322-1329). All 
the test shows is that 63 percent of the material was larger 
than minus 200, not that any of this material would have with-
stood the further crushing required to produce specification 
material. 
r
 Parson was basically experimenting to see whether 
various modifications would improve the quality of the 
product. None did. Wilson testified that any additional 
techniques simply were not workable. (Tr. 457-459). 
UDOT does not dispute that as a result of the fore-
going difficulties it decided to enter into a supplemental 
agreement with Parson (now characterized as a "concession" or 
"compromise") (Ex. 26-P). However, UDOT acted unreasonably by 
attempting to limit the scope of that agreement to the removal 
of 15 feet of overburden, although their own core drillings 
showed that 35 feet had to be removed. (Tr. 368-370). 
UDOT now denies that there was 35 feet of overburden 
by disingenuously implying that their own test holes were 
drilled in the wrong locations. Two of the holes were drilled 
only 200 feet east of the face of the pit, rather than the 400 
feet claimed in UDOT's brief (Tr. 1065). Parson assumes that 
UDOT drilled where it did because Parson's removal of materials 
vas progressing eastward from the face. UDOT must have assumed 
the locations to be representative at the time, since it 
selected them. 
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Tr. 1587 one of the contractors testified that he planned to 
begin operations in pit no. 1, not that he intended to get all 
of his materials from there. More importantly/ Parson offered 
to move to pit no. 1, even though it felt that pit no. 1 did 
not contain sufficient material. (Ex. 29-P). 
The reason set forth by UDOT for Spensko's refusal to 
test the BLM property to the north of Prospect 2 is unaccept-
able. Spensko assumed that the material seen from a surface 
inspection was representative of the material behind the face. 
Of course this is the same mistaken assumption he made regard-
ing Prospect 2. Also, at the time he was making this assump-
tion, Spensko was aware of overburden 28 feet deep on the BLM 
property (Tr. 1080-1081). On page 15 of its brief, UDOT states 
that a subsequent contractor used the BLM property to complete 
the work. That allegation is totally improper since it raises 
facts entirely outside of the record on appeal. Moreover, like 
other UDOT representations, this one is also totally mis-
leading. UDOT relaxed specifications for the new contractor, 
despite a contract price nearly twice as high as Parson's. 
What the record shows is that the BLM property was not made 
available to Parson until too late, and that UDOT subsequently 
corrected its representations concerning site conditions to 
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show the softness and variation of the material likely to be 
encountered. (Tr. 381-383; Ex 183-P). 
The letter cited by UDOT as making it "clear" that 
Parson could have used the BLM property "prior to formal 
written permission" says no such thing. All it does is 
estimate when future BLM approval might be obtained (Ex. 
30-P) . The only "guarantee" Parson asked for regarding the BLM 
property was the same one it requested regarding prospect No. 
2, that UDOT stand behind its representations. UDOT con-
sistently refused to do so. 
x
 The final section of UDOT's Statement of Fact alleges 
Parson responsibility for failing to discover the information 
UDOT had scattered throughout its files. As will be argued 
more fully below, where the government makes affirmative mis-
representations rather than merely withholds facts, failure of 
the contractor to inspect referenced documents will not allow 
the government to avoid liability. As discussed elsewhere, 
there were numerous affirmative misrepresentations or mis-
leading statements in the contract documents. 
This latter part of UDOT's factual presentation is 
similar to the earlier parts, factually inconsistent and un-
supported by the record. In some places UDOT alleges that the 
withheld information was extremely important and so Parson was 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remiss in not hunting for it. In other places it alleges that 
the information was unimportant and so was not included in the 
plans and specifications. On the one hand UDOT asserts that 
the plans and specifications accurately portrayed Prospect 2. 
On the other it argues that review of the documents on file 
would have revealed the problems Parson subsequently en-
countered. ,. v 
UDOT responds to the high wear test results in its 
files by stating that Prospect 2 had already produced specifi-
cation materials for other contractors. Of course, as dis-
cussed above, these specifications were easier to meet than the 
ones applicable to Parson (Special Provision Sheets 31 & 32). 
Moreover, these other contractors had great difficulty ob-
taining competent material, leading to the express recommenda-
tion that the pit not be used in the future (Tr. 1194-1195; Ex. 
81-P; Tr. 861-862).
 r 
UDOT's claim that soft material makes for "easy 
crushing" avoids the issue. Whether the material is hard or 
soft, the information provided by the State must be accurate in 
order for the contractor to prepare a fair bid and perform the 
contract adequately. From Sheet 2B and Special Provision 44 
one might expect 10-15 percent of the material would be too 
soft for specification, but no one would expect virtually all 
of the material to fall in that category. 
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UDOT finally gets to the heart of the matter when it 
admits at p. 17 of its brief that there was "no known alter-
native" to these material sources. Spensko1s cited testimony 
makes it clear that the reason he ignored the advice of a prior 
UDOT project engineer to find another location and the reason 
he defined the material in these sources as being of "excellent 
quality" is that there was no other alternative (Tr. 
1012-1016). UDOT decided to use these sources regardless of 
their quality. 
UDOT's description of Spensko's tests show their 
defects. They were done only on the face of the pits, on the 
apparent assumption that the material behind the face was the 
same (notwithstanding UDOT's allegations that Parson was negli-
gent in failing to discover this material was not the same) . 
Had Spensko followed the testing pattern required by UDOT's 
regulations, he would have discovered that the material was not 
the same. Thus, it was not "realistic" to decide not to do 
further testing. Spensko's rationalizations for this decision 
again show that UDOT intended to use these pits regardless of 
what the tests showed (Ex. 92-B, Tr. 1000-1013, 1021-1022). 
Spensko's complaint of inadequate time to do further testing 
especially rings hollow, in light of the degree of testing and 
pre-bid investigation UDOT now claims Parson should have per-
formed in a shorter period of time. 
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\ Interestingly enough, Spensko states that his decision 
not to discose the "historical" information in UDOT's files was 
because specification changes gave the information questionable 
value (Tr. 1028-1029). This is the same information cited by 
UDOT in claiming other contractors had "successfully" used 
Prospect 2 and in claiming that Parson's pre-bid investigation 
was negligent. Much of this "historical" information is not 
even referenced by the contract documents. 
The UDOT employee who performed the L.A. Rattler test 
after Parson commenced performance came to the site at the re-
quest of the UDOT project engineer who indicated there was a 
problem with material breakdown (Tr. 883-901). Even with the 
margin for error alleged by UDOT, the test result significantly 
exceeded the 40% maximum (Tr. 895-902). The fact that the 
UDOT employee "informed" no one of this result hardly excul-
pates UDOT, especially since the test was filed in UDOT files. 
In November, this same employee again tested pit no. 2 at 
UDOT's direction, and again received an L.A. Rattler result in 
excess of 40% (Tr. 902-908). This time Spensko was told of the 
results. The record established that numerous variables affect 
the outcome of L.A. Rattler tests. However, the independent 
tests Parson had perfomed were consistent with the UDOT tests 
taken about the same time, in showing a severe wear problem in 
Prospect No. 2 (Tr. 289-304, 600-604; Ex. 35-P). 
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Recognizing the "problems" with the designated sources 
for this project, UDOT specifically requested aid from the 
Federal Highway Administration indicating the materials had 
been "incorrectly identified" (Ex. 101-P). The fact that, at 
the time, Taylor did not realize the effect of his admission 
against interest that UDOT "incorrectly identified" the 
materials in Prospect 2 does not make that admission any less 
important. Since FHWA did realize the effect of that admis-
sion, it indicated UDOT would be responsible for any increased 
expense (Ex. 102-P) . ••-.*• 
Finally, UDOT completely mischaracterizes the testi-
mony of its witnesses concerning the geology of the area. At 
several places in Swapp's testimony he notes the possibility of 
faulting (Tr. 1475-1476, 1483). Spensko and Lund could not 
tell whether there was faulting or not, although Lund indicated 
that the evidence was highly suggestive of faulting (Tr. 1092 
et. seg., 1723 et. seq.). All three men relied largely upon 
aerial photographs that, as Waggoner explained, were optically 
deceiving (Tr. 812). Swapp had not worked in that area in ten 
years and Lund had never visited the job site. 
Thus, Waggoner's testimony (Tr. 767-784) as to the 
sudden and unforeseeable change in the character of Prospect 2 
stands unrebutted, as does the testimony of Neff (Tr. 899-918) 
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on the numerous varieties of materials in Prospect 2 other than 
limestone. UDOT attempts to shrug this latter point off by 
claiming that this was a mere withholding of information other-
wise discoverable by Parson. Instead, it is a positive mis-
representation. UDOT did not merely indicate that Prospect 2 
was in a limestone formation or that limestone was among the 
materials contained in the prospect. It stated "this prospect 
consists of limestone ledgerock" which was untrue. 
- ARGUMENT
 v< 
This case is squarely controlled by Thorn Construction 
Co., Inc. v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979). UDOT acknowledges 
this fact by urging the court to overrule Thorn. Under Thorn, 
a contractor may recover when, acting reasonably, he is mislead 
by incorrect plans and specifications issued as the basis for 
bids. As discussed below, each of these elements is present in 
the instant case: UDOT's statements were materially incorrect; 
Parson acted reasonably; and UDOT's statements were both in-
tended to be relied upon and were relied upon as the basis for 
bids. 
I. UDOT Made Numerous False and Misleading Statements. 
UDOT made numerous affirmative misrepresentations 
and/or misleading statements in the contract documents, in-
cluding: I 
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(1) that Prospect 2 was "acceptable in general" 
[Standard Specification Subsection 106.02(a)]?
 ( 
(2) that Prospect 2 "consists of limestone ledge-
rock" (Special Provision Sheet No. 44); 
(3) that other contractors had used Prospect 2 
(implying successful use) (Special Provision Sheet 
No. 44; and 
(4) that test results (impliedly performed in 
accordance with UDOT requirements) indicated Prospect 
2's suitability (Plan Sheet No. 2B). 
Evidence explored above, along with the Findings of 
the court, establish the falsity of this information. In 
particular, the Finding that the material first encountered was 
poor and subsequently became worse contradicts almost every one 
of these representations (Finding No. 28). There was no repre-
sentative sampling, as UDOT contends. Only the information 
reflecting favorably on use of Prospect 2 was provided. The 
decision of the trial court was not based on the accuracy of 
UDOT's representations, but on the mistaken view that UDOT was 
not bound by its representations (Conclusion No. 6). 
In another example of the unreliable information 
Parson has received from UDOT throughout the controversy, UDOT 
claims on page 22 of its brief that "pit 2 contained suitable 
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material but required careful quality control in aggregate pro-
duction" and that a prior contractor "by contrast was careful 
and selective in the material and methods it used and succeeded 
where appellant failed." Based on personal knowledge rather 
than UDOT representations, that same contractor bid $650,000 
higher than Parson on the project at issue (Ex. 6-P). 
Clearly, the instant controversy falls squarely within 
the scope of Thorn. If anything, the instant case is an even 
stronger case for the contractor. Thorn involved one general 
oral representation; here there are several affirmative repre-
sentations in the written contract documents specifically 
relating to performance of the specifications. There is no 
basis for the State's rather revealing request that Thorn be 
"disregarded, if not specifically overruled." 
II. Parson Had No Duty to Discover the 
Falsity of UDOT's Representations. 
As stated above, Thorn requires the contractor to act 
reasonably. UDOT suggests this imposed upon Parson a duty to 
discover, by availing itself of UDOT's files and other informa-
tion, the falsity of UDOT's representations. This is not the 
law. 
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A distinction must be made between cases such as the 
instant one, in which the State makes a positive, material mis-
representation, and those cases in which the State merely pro-
vides insufficient information without misrepresenting a 
material fact. 
Flippin Materials Co. v. U.S., 312 F.2d 408 (Ct. CI. 
1963), relied upon heavily by UDOT, aptly illustrates this dis-
tinction. There, the contractor's claim was based upon the 
government's failure to make a representation, and not on a 
governmental misrepresentation. The government prevailed based 
on the contractor's failure to inspect government referenced 
documents. Significantly, at page 413, note 7, the court made 
it clear that had the claim been for a misrepresentation, such 
misrepresentation would not be excused by general warnings to 
review or inspect documents. Tri-County Excavating, Inc. v. 
Borough of Kingston, 407 A.2d 462 (Pa. 1979), also relied upon 
by UDOT, explicitly distinguishes its facts from cases of mis-
representation ("constructive fraud"). 
In fact, UDOT does not cite a single case in which the 
government made a material misrepresentation; it cites only 
"silence" cases. See, e.g., Highland Construction Co. v. 
Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981), L.A. Young Sons Construc-
tion Co. v. County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978), R. C. 
Tollman Construction Co. v. Myton Water Association, 563 P.2d 
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780 (Utah 1971), and J.A. Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaii, 465 
P.2d 148 (Hawaii 1970). The misrepresentation cases hold that 
failure to inspect referenced documents does not make a con-
tractor's reliance upon governmental representations unreason-
able. See, e.g., Stock & Grove, Inc. v. U.S., 493 F.2d 629 
(Ct. CI. 1974); Haggart Construction Co. v. State Highway 
Commission, 427 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1967). 
Thorn clearly established that a contractor in Utah 
has no duty to discover the falsity of positive assertions, 
regardless of the UDOT disclaimer. Quoting from Hollerbach v. 
U.S., 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914), this court stated: 
We think it would be going quite too far to 
interpret the general language of the other 
paragraphs as requiring independent investiga-
tion of facts which the specifications 
furnished by the government as a basis of the 
contract left in no doubt. . . . In its 
positive assertion of the nature of this much 
of the work it made a representation upon which 
the claimants had a right to reply [sic] with-
out an investigation to prove its falsity. 
598 P.2d at 368 (Emphasis added). 
This rule particularly applies where, as here, the contractor 
has insufficient time to conduct such an investigation. See, 
e.g., Haggart, supra, (2 weeks); Canty Asphalt, Inc. v. State, 
337 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (N.Y. 1972) (3 weeks). Parson had less than 
three weeks to conduct the elaborate pre-bid investigation 
argued for by UDOT. 
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Finally, this distinction is a fair one. A party who 
has made representations for the obvious purpose that they be 
believed and relied upon may not avoid liability by arguing 
that the deceived party should not have believed and relied 
upon them. Yet this is what UDOT is arguing. Of course this 
argument assumes that the representations in question were 
false, or, at any rate, so misleading as to cause an inaccurate 
bid. UDOT is inconsistently asserting on the one hand that the 
plans and specifications accurately portrayed Prospect 2, and, 
on the other, that reliance upon that portrayal was unreason-
able because contradicted by documents on file. In fact, 
although the information was inaccurate, the positive, affirma-
tive way in which it was presented in the contract documents 
made reliance upon it eminently reasonable. 
UDOT attempts to circumvent these well-established 
principles by blatantly mischaracterizing Wunderlich v. 
California, 423 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1967). UDOT states at page 25 
of its brief that a contractor cannot recover unless the state 
"knowingly" misrepresents or "intentionally" withholds. 
Wunderlich merely holds that the information must be "within 
the State's knowledge", not that the State must act knowingly 
or intentionally. Wunderlich does establish that a disclaimer 
is effective only when there has been no misrepresentation or 
withholding of critical information. 
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III. Sheet No, 2B and the Other Documents Relied 
Upon by Parson Were Offered and Received as 
Part of the "Basis for the Bid,r7 
Thorn allows a contractor to recover where he is "mis-
led by incorrect plans and specifications issued by the public 
authorities as the basis for bids . . . ", 598 P.2d at 368. 
Under Thorn, as pointed out in appellant's initial brief, the 
trial court's interpretation that Sheet No. 2B was not a docu-
ment that could be relied upon was a fundamental error of law. 
More important than a technical definition of "plans" 
or "specifications" is whether the incorrect information was 
intended to be relied upon as the basis for bids. UDOT makes 
the technical argument in an attempt to circumvent Thorn con-
tending that the written material is not included within the 
formal "plans and specifications". 
The evidence clearly establishes that Sheet No. 2B and 
Special Provision No. 44 were relied upon by Parson as a basis 
for its bid. These documents confirmed the misrepresentation 
that the material was acceptable in general. Sheet 2B was pre-
sented in such a way as to leave no doubt that UDOT intended it 
to be relied on as the basis for bids. It was bound to and 
indistinguishable from the plans and specifications, and in-
cluded a technical description of Prospects 1 and 2. The State 
should not have supplied Sheet 2B at all if it was not to be 
used in bidding. 
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Resolution of this issue is much easier here than in 
Thorn, where the court held that a contractor had a right to 
rely upon an oral representation. Certainly an oral represen-
tation is much less likely to be construed as part of the plans 
and specifications or the basis for bids than a written docu-
ment like Sheet No. 2B. Of course, the most significant mis-
representations made by UDOT were contained in Special Pro-
vision No. 44, which UDOT does not dispute was a part of the 
plans and specifications.
 t 
Parson's right to rely is unaffected by whether Sub-
section 104.02 (authorizing supplemental agreements) is a 
"true" changed conditions clause. UDOT's attempts at pages 
40-45 of its brief to distinguish Fattore v. Metropolitan Sewer 
Comission of Milwaukee, 454 F.2d 537 (7th Cir., 1977) and Stock 
& Grove, Inc. v. United States, 493 F.2d 629 (Ct. CI. 1974) on 
the basis that these cases involved "true" changed conditions 
clauses, are futile. As Thorn shows, the principles followed 
in these cases apply whether or not there is a changed con-
ditions clause. 
On the other hand, UDOT's cite to Jack B. Parson 
Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), as 
a case interpreting Subsection 104.02, is gratuitous. That 
case did not become relevant simply because Parson was a 
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party. There, the only issue was the amount of the computation 
under a Subsection 104.02 supplemental agreement, not the 
question of what work was covered. UDOT's proferred interpre-
tation of this provision ignores or defies all of the rules of 
construction discussed in Parson's first brief. UDOT also 
conveniently ignores its own interpretation of this provision 
during Parson's attempted performance, when UDOT expressly 
agreed to enter into a "supplemental agreement" (Ex. 2G-P). 
Parson was entitled to a supplemental agreement and, when it 
was no longer financially capable of going forward, it was 
entitled to suspend performance. Metropolitan Sewerage Com'n. 
v. R.W. Construction, 241 N.W. 2d 371 (Wise. 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
Parson is aware of no jurisdiction, including this 
one, that follows the rule proposed by UDOT and adopted by the 
trial court. This rule would require contractors to bear all 
risk of governmental misrepresentations in contract documents. 
In addition to the inherent unfairness of such a rule, there is 
an obvious policy barrier. If UDOT's position is adopted and 
the trial court is affirmed, bidders will be required to 
inflate their bids as a hedge against governmental misrepresen-
tations. This frustrates the whole purpose of competitive 
bidding for public contracts, which is to obtain the lowest 
reasonable contract price. 
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As UDOT points out, the decision of the district court 
here and that of this court in Thorn cannot stand together.^ 
The only way that the Court can ratify the strong principles 
behind Thorn is to reverse the decision of the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ffi day of August, 1983. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
TAYLOR & BRYAN 
Jaitiefi A. Boevers 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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